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Privacy principles, risks and harms 
Abstract 
The protection of privacy is predicated on the individual’s right to privacy and 
stipulates a number of principles that are primarily focused on information privacy or data 
protection and, as such, are insufﬁcient to apply to other types of privacy and to the 
protection of other entities beyond the individual. This article identiﬁes additional privacy 
principles that would apply to other types of privacy and would enhance the consideration of 
risks or harms to the individual, to groups and to society as a whole if they are violated. They 
also relate to the way privacy impact assessment (PIA) may be conducted. There are 
important reasons for generating consideration of and debate about these principles. First, 
they help to recalibrate a focus in Europe on data protection to the relative neglect of other 
types of privacy. Second, it is of critical importance at a time when PIA (renamed ‘data 
protection impact assessment’, or DPIA) may become mandatory under the European 
Commission’s proposed Data Protection Regulation. Such assessment is an important 
instrument for identifying and mitigating privacy risks, but should address all types of 
privacy. Third, one can construct an indicative table identifying harms or risks to these 
additional privacy principles, which can serve as an important tool or instrument for a 
broader PIA to address other types of privacy. 
Keywords:  privacy principles; types of privacy; privacy risks; privacy impact assessment; 
surveillance impact assessment 
  
Introduction 
The protection of information privacy has made signiﬁcant advances during the past 40 or 50 
years, with the global proliferation of national, sub-national and international legislation, the 
development of rights-based jurisprudence, and a plethora of regulatory initiatives and 
practical measures to safeguard ‘personal data’ or ‘personally identiﬁable information’ (PII) 
(Bennett and Raab 2006). These developments have been predicated upon sets of privacy 
principles that can be used to identify problematic practices in the processing of such 
information. Regulatory measures have emphasised the necessity of mitigating threats to 
individuals posed by the burgeoning appetite, in both the public and private sectors, for 
collecting, using and sharing data for a host of commercial and governmental purposes.  
There have been many formulations of privacy principles since the 1960s and 1970s, when 
the main concern of policy-makers and commentators was with ‘computers-and- privacy’ 
issues generated by ‘data banks’ and their use. These codiﬁcations have therefore primarily 
focused on only one type of privacy, i.e., information privacy or data protection, even though 
– as we will show – several other types of privacy also have claims to protection. However, 
there have been no formulations of privacy principles that speciﬁcally address these other 
types of privacy, nor of the privacy risks or harms that could arise from their violation. 
While the link between privacy and human rights is widely acknowledged, historically 
rooted, and strong, modern developments in the ‘information age’ have brought the 
information and communication dimensions to the fore and equipped them with regulatory 
instruments for their protection. It is not clear how far other types of privacy can be, or are, 
subsumed or incorporated into the theory and practice of information privacy protection, but 
they are too important to be left in the background or implicit in the protections afforded to 
‘privacy’ by national or international law and regulation that focus speciﬁcally on the 
processing and ﬂows of personal information. As we show, regulatory practitioners in several 
countries have moved towards recognising the invasion of other types of privacy besides 
information privacy as requiring regulation. However, now that there is a heightened 
perception and deeper understanding of the pervasiveness of surveillance, as well as 
recognition of its effects beyond that of individual privacy, there is a need to move towards a 
formulation of principles for mitigating these effects beyond the compass of information 
privacy principles and their implementation. 
Bennett (2011) has argued that information privacy protection has, in practice, already 
widened its horizon to include social effects and implications for other dimensions of privacy 
besides the informational. The current article acknowledges the force of this defence and 
aims to take its message seriously by grounding more systematically the widening of the 
inventory of norms and instruments for a broader protection of privacy. It is not that ‘privacy’ 
is too narrow or impotent to contend with contemporary infringements of rights, but that 
information privacy and the array of principles designed specifically for its protection might 
be too limited for this contention. It has been remarked that information privacy principles 
‘are oriented towards the protection of data about people, rather than the protection of people 
themselves’ (Clarke 2000, s. 2.4). Can a further step be taken, towards a fuller view of 
people’s privacy and how it can be protected? This article proposes a more comprehensive 
view of privacy and the principles that might be devised for its better and more holistic 
protection. 
The present article supports a broader protection of privacy by positing a set of privacy 
principles that can support privacy rights other than data protection. We also favour an 
innovation in privacy impact assessment (PIA), i.e., a PIA that specifically addresses types of 
privacy other than, or in addition to, data protection. As will be shown later (Table 2), 
examples of the harms and risks that can arise in regard to other types of privacy can be 
enlisted in support of the PIA innovation proposed here. 
This article reviews various formulations of information privacy principles that have shaped 
regulatory practice over a long period of time. It then refers to an expanded inventory of 
seven types of privacy and goes on to identify additional privacy principles that pertain to 
them. Following a discussion of privacy risks, the article concludes with arguments that show 
why privacy principles need to be debated. Although case law in Europe and the USA shows 
that the courts have pronounced on a wider variety of types of privacy, legal analysis is 
outside the scope of this paper. We argue that there is a need to recalibrate privacy and data 
protection policy and regulation by extending their scope. 
Approach and methodology 
We address our topic by taking, broadly speaking, the following main steps: First, we identify 
the problem – i.e., there is a great risk of equating privacy and data protection. Data 
protection is only one type of privacy, and there are several types of privacy, all of which 
merit protection. However, in Europe, data protection gets more attention from policy-makers 
than other types of privacy. 
Second, we sketch the argument on which this article turns. We argue that other types of 
privacy are important and must be acknowledged, otherwise we risk greatly circumscribing 
the notion of privacy. 
Third, we note that data protection is supported by various principles, and that the other types 
of privacy should also be served by a set of principles. We deﬁne privacy principles and 
rights. 
Fourth, privacy principles are important because they form the basis for the formulation of 
questions that organisations can use to determine whether their new technology, system, 
project or policy might pose risks to one or more types of privacy. We give some examples of 
risks to other types of privacy. 
Fifth, we argue that PIA provides a good framework for identifying, assessing and managing 
privacy risks. However, PIA can be distinguished from DPIA. The process for undertaking 
each is virtually identical, but their scopes are different. 
Sixth, we draw some conclusions and identify some solutions to the challenges identiﬁed in 
this article. 
En route to our conclusions, we present two tables, the ﬁrst of which shows a correlation 
between speciﬁc privacy principles and types of privacy, while the second provides an 
indicative list of the privacy principles articulated in this article and the types of harms or 
risks that could violate these principles. As noted elsewhere, such tables may be useful in PIA 
and surveillance impact assessment (SIA). 
The methodology used for preparing this article primarily consists of desk research and 
reasoned argument. It does not include surveys, interviews or other techniques for gathering 
empirical data. 
Privacy principles 
The principles on which regulatory systems for information privacy have been built give rise 
to rules and guidelines for the fair collection and processing of personal data, although legal 
and practical experience over many years has shown that ‘personal data’ is not an 
unambiguous concept. Regulatory law and practice ideally depend upon precision in the 
expression and elaboration of principles and the guidelines, codes of practice and other 
instruments that constitute implementation. Given the globalisation of information proces- 
sing, consistency in the enunciation of principles and perforce in their legal embodiment and 
practical interpretation has been seen as important, although concrete variations are tol- 
erable as long as the underlying principles are reasonably uniform. 
However, a broad brush is useful at this stage of the argument. Generally speaking, while the 
numbering and wording of the principles vary in different formulations, a consen- sus exists. 
Thus, to paraphrase legal language, a public or private organisation that deals with PII 
should: be accountable for all of the personal information in its possession; identify the 
purposes for which the information is processed at or before the time of collection; only 
collect personal information with the knowledge and consent of the individual (except under 
speciﬁed circumstances); limit the collection of personal information to that which is 
necessary for pursuing the identiﬁed purposes; not use or disclose personal information for 
purposes other than those identiﬁed (except with the individual’s consent); retain infor- 
mation only as long as necessary; ensure that personal information is kept accurate, com- 
plete and up to date; protect personal information with appropriate security safeguards; be 
transparent  about its policies and practices and maintain no secret information system; allow 
data subjects access to their personal information, with an ability to amend it if it is 
inaccurate, incomplete or obsolete (Bennett and Grant 1999, 6). 
For analysing wider realms of privacy beyond information privacy, and for exploring harms 
or risks, it is useful to go beyond pastiche and look at the provenance and more recent 
adoption, in selected jurisdictions, of what are taken to be the principles as distilled into 
colloquial or summary expressions. These strictures are manifested in some of the most 
inﬂuential documents from the 1970s to the present, illustrating the predominance of 
information privacy and its principles in regulatory development.1 An early enunciation of 
information privacy principles was in the US Department of Health Education and Welfare 
(HEW)’s 1973 Fair Information Practice Principles (‘FIPPs’) (HEW 1973).2 The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 1980) drew on these but 
expanded them.3 They cover collection limitation; data quality; purpose speciﬁcation; use 
limitation; security safeguards; openness; individual participation; and accountability. The 
OECD Guidelines have been very inﬂuential across the world in countries’ adoption of their 
own data protection legislation. They explicitly state that they apply only to personal data: 
the Guidelines do not constitute a set of general privacy protection principles; invasions of privacy by, 
for instance, candid photography, physical maltreatment, or defamation are outside their scope unless 
such acts are in one way or another associated with the handling of personal data.4 
Thus, the OECD implicitly recognises other types of privacy and the need for privacy 
principles beyond its own. In 2005, the Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation’s Privacy Frame- 
work (APEC 2005) adopted nine ‘information privacy principles’, which built upon the 
OECD Guidelines and sought to modernise them (Cate 2006, 353). 
The Council of Europe’s 1981 Convention (CoE 1981) has had a greater inﬂuence than the 
OECD Guidelines in the legislation of European Union (EU) Member States and in the EU’s 
own data protection Directive 95/46/EC (European Parliament and the Council 1995) (to be 
superseded by a new Regulation). With minor, albeit important, changes of wording, the 
Directive replicated these Convention Articles, and added further rules about the legitimacy 
of processing and the transfer of personal data to third countries.5 
Other sets of principles can be found.6 Australia’s Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy 
Protection) Act 2012 came into force from March 2014. The new Act contains signiﬁcant 
reforms to the Privacy Act, including replacing the National Privacy Principles for the private 
sector and Information Privacy Principles for Commonwealth and Australian Capital 
Territory Government agencies with a single consolidated set of principles referred to as the 
Australian Privacy Principles (‘APPs’).7 The Canadian Standards Association (1996) has a 
set of 10 principles based on the OECD Guidelines. New Zealand’s Privacy Act 1993 sets out 
12 information privacy principles (IPPs), based upon international principles of fair 
information practice.8 
In December 2011, the International Organization for Standardization published an 
international standard for privacy principles (ISO 29100), which, it says, were derived from 
existing principles developed by various states, countries and international organisations (ISO 
2011). Although some might argue that the OECD Guidelines or the CoE’s Convention are 
de facto international standards, the ISO’s work is signiﬁcant because it formulates 
information privacy principles as a standard that could have ubiquitous force, although its 
speciﬁc inﬂuence has yet to be seen. In any event, it has been ‘adopted’ for the purpose of 
this article. Its 11 privacy principles are brieﬂy described below: 
(1) Consent and choice: presenting to the PII ‘data subject’ the choice whether or not to 
allow the processing of her PII. 
(2) Purpose legitimacy and speciﬁcation: ensuring that the purpose(s) complies with 
applicable law. 
(3) Collection limitation: limiting the collection of PII to that which is within the bounds 
of applicable law and strictly necessary for the speciﬁed purpose(s). 
(4) Data minimisation: minimising the PII which is processed and the number of privacy 
stakeholders and people to whom PII is disclosed or who have access to it. 
(5) Use, retention and disclosure limitation: limiting the use, retention and disclosure 
(including transfer) of PII to that which is necessary in order to fulﬁl speciﬁc, explicit 
and legitimate purposes. 
(6) Accuracy and quality: ensuring that the PII processed is accurate, complete, up to date 
(unless there is a legitimate basis for keeping outdated data), adequate and relevant for 
the purpose of use. 
(7) Openness, transparency and notice: providing PII principals with clear and easily 
accessible information about the PII controller’s policies, procedures and practices 
with respect to the processing of PII. 
(8) Individual participation and access: giving data subjects the ability to access and 
review their PII, provided their identity is ﬁrst authenticated. 
(9) Accountability: assigning to a speciﬁed individual within the organisation the task of 
implementing the privacy-related policies, procedures and practices. 
(10) Information security: protecting PII under an organisation’s control with appropriate 
controls at the operational, functional and strategic level to ensure the integrity, 
conﬁdentiality and availability of the PII, and to protect it against risks such as 
unauthorised access, destruction, use, modiﬁcation, disclosure or loss. 
(11) Privacy compliance: verifying and demonstrating that the processing meets data 
protection and privacy safeguards (legislation and/or regulation) by periodically 
conducting audits using internal or trusted third-party auditors. 
Other types of privacy 
Several analytically discrete types of privacy are considered in this article. One type is 
information privacy, associated with data protection, but it is only one of several. We derive 
our typology from that articulated by Clarke (1997) and further elaborated by Finn, Wright, 
and Friedewald (2013).9 Clarke identiﬁed four categories (or types) of privacy and outlined 
speciﬁc protections. His four categories are: privacy of the person; of behaviour; of data; and 
of communication. He notes that, with the close coupling that has occurred between 
computing and communications, particularly since the 1980s, the last two aspects have 
become closely linked, and are commonly referred to as ‘information privacy’. Others, such 
as Solove (2006), have also developed a taxonomy of privacy; however, Solove’s taxonomy 
focuses on potentially harmful or problematic activities affecting private matters or activities, 
rather than characterising types of privacy. Most of the items in his taxonomy are grounded in 
information privacy, although ‘decisional interference’ engages other types such as the body, 
the home, the family, and activities or practices related to these. 
A variety of other multiple-category formulations can be found. A fourfold division of 
‘separate but related concepts’ – information privacy, bodily privacy, privacy of 
communications, and territorial privacy – is used in a compendious international survey of 
privacy laws and developments (Electronic Privacy Information Center and Privacy 
International 2007, 3). Different formulations appear in the PIA handbooks of Australia, 
Victoria State, Ontario and the United Kingdom. For example, the Ofﬁce of the Victorian 
Privacy Commissioner states that ‘[t]he right to privacy in the Charter [of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities] covers not just information privacy, but bodily, territorial, locational and 
communications privacy’ (OVPC 2009, 2). Similarly, the Ontario Information and Privacy 
Ofﬁce PIA guide says that organisations should look at other types of privacy besides that of 
personal information: physical freedom from surveillance; person or personal space; 
communication; and the ability to control the sharing of their personal information (OCIPO 
2010, 37).10 
The UK Information Commissioner’s Ofﬁce’s (ICO) PIA Handbook (version 2) provides 
more detail than the other privacy commissioners’ guides with regard to each of the different 
types of privacy that closely resemble Clarke’s schema (ICO 2009, 14). The Handbook 
describes each of these four types as follows: 
Privacy of personal information is referred to variously as ‘data privacy’ and ‘information privacy’. 
Individuals generally do not want data about themselves to be automatically available to other individuals and 
organisations. Even where data is possessed by another party, the individual should be able to exercise a 
substantial degree of control over that data and its use. The last six decades have seen the application of 
information technologies that in many ways have had substantial impacts on information privacy. 
Privacy of the person, sometimes referred to as ‘bodily privacy’, is concerned with the integrity of the 
individual’s body. At its broadest, it could be interpreted as extending to freedom from torture and right to 
medical treatment, but these are more commonly seen as separate human rights rather than as aspects of privacy. 
Issues that are more readily associated with privacy include body searches, compulsory immunisation, blood 
transfusion without consent, compulsory provision of samples of body ﬂuids and body tissue, and requirements 
for submission to biometric measurement. 
Privacy of personal behaviour relates to the observation of what individuals do, and includes such issues as 
optical surveillance and ‘media privacy’. It could relate to matters such as sexual preferences and habits, 
political or trade union activities and religious practices. But the notion of ‘private space’ is vital to all aspects 
of behaviour, is relevant in ‘private places’ such as the home and the toilet cubicle, and is also relevant in 
‘public places’, where casual observation by the few people in the vicinity is very different from systematic 
observation, the recording or transmission of images and sounds. 
Privacy of personal  communications could include various means of analysing or recording communications 
such as mail ‘covers’, the use of directional microphones and ‘bugs’ with or without recording apparatus and 
telephonic interception and recording. In recent years, concerns have arisen about third party access to email 
messages. Individuals generally desire the freedom to communicate among themselves, using various media, 
without routine monitoring of their communications by other persons or organisations.11 
It is important to identify and characterise the different types of privacy, as Finn, Wright, and 
Friedewald (2013) have done, because all types of privacy merit protection. In order to 
construct protections, the different types of privacy have to be identiﬁed and articulated. 
Clarke’s four categories or types of privacy have generally been sufﬁcient, but new 
technological, governmental and commercial developments have tested the limits of these 
four documents, unmanned aerial vehicles, second-generation DNA sequencing technologies, 
human-enhancement technologies and second-generation biometrics raise additional privacy  
issues concerning not only the body and its movement, but the mind and space as well.12 
Such new technologies implicate several types of privacy that are partially  reﬂected  in  the  
ICO’s Handbook as well as in the philosophical, legal, and social science literature on 
privacy. Yet these types have become especially signiﬁcant in recent years as a result of the 
development of technologies and – perhaps more importantly – of the new applications and 
purposes to which states and commercial organisations are ﬁnding for them. In some 
contexts, one may see overlaps with the conventional fourfold or other inventories of privacy 
types. As has been noted, existing regulatory practice does not altogether ignore these types 
as sources of issues that might be regulated under existing legal provision, although this goes 
against the grain of privacy-as-data-protection. But the additional types are sufﬁciently 
distinctive to provide a useful expansion of the scope of privacy protection. Distinguishing 
them helps to focus attention more systematically on novel threats and threats to broader 
dimensions of privacy that are created by the combination of technological capability and 
organizational policy and practice. Therefore, three other types of privacy should be added; 
namely, privacy of location and space; of thoughts and feelings; and of association (including 
group privacy).13 Thus: 
Privacy of location refers to the right of an individual to be present in a location or space without being tracked 
or monitored or without anyone knowing where he or she is. ‘Space’ could be physical or cyber space. 
Privacy of thoughts and feelings is the counterpart to bodily privacy. Some scholars have identiﬁed what they 
call ‘decisional privacy’. This is manifested in USA court decisions and legislation that, for example, give 
women the right to make decisions concerning their bodies, such as deciding whether to terminate a pregnancy. 
Such decisional privacy could be captured within or subsumed under the privacy of thoughts and feelings 
identiﬁed by Finn, Wright, and Friedewald (2013). 
Privacy of association includes social and political relationships formed by people at different levels of scale, 
from the intimate to larger groups and collectivities. 
We recognise that two or more types of privacy could be implicated by a new technology or 
service, such that some might see this as a blurring of types. Generally, however, we view 
privacy of personal behaviour as distinct from privacy of location. Privacy of behaviour 
means that one should be able to behave as one wishes without that behaviour being 
monitored. Privacy of location is different. It does not refer to behaviour or conduct within a 
space; it refers simply to the right of a person to travel through physical and cyber space 
without being tracked. To travel through cyber space means simply to surf the Internet 
without being tracked from one website to another. 
There is a relationship among all seven types of privacy: they all relate to the individual’s 
‘space’, both internal and external, her functioning within that space and her relation- ship 
with others. Thus, there is a coherence and a comprehensiveness to the seven types or privacy 
that is often missing in other postulated types of privacy. While more than one type of 
privacy might be manifested, implicated or threatened in any form of behaviour or activity by 
the self or others, they are all compatible with Clarke’s metaphorical deﬁnition of privacy as 
‘the interest that individuals have in sustaining a “personal space”, free from interference by 
other people and organisations’ (Clarke 2000, s. 2.1). Moreover, not only do the seven types 
speak to values pertaining to individuals, they also sustain social and political values that are 
deeply rooted in pluralistic societies and liberal democracies. The seven types of privacy 
provide granularity and speciﬁcity to the notion of privacy rights. In other words, each of the 
seven types of privacy provides a basis for conceptualising a right to privacy – or, rather, 
several privacy rights. 
Furthermore, the seven types of privacy provide a concrete basis for regulation and protection 
that is absent from more abstract conceptualisations of privacy. These seven types of privacy 
provide a useful basis for identifying, analysing and assessing privacy risks and harms and 
formulating protections for the various types of privacy by means of a more encompassing 
PIA than is generally used, in which data protection is at the forefront.14 Most PIAs are 
actually DPIAs in the sense that they focus on data protection, rather than other types of 
privacy. 
Additional privacy principles 
It is important to formulate additional privacy principles that speciﬁcally address all types of 
privacy, in part because they provide a basis for considering the risks or harms that may arise 
to the individual, to groups and to society as a whole when one, or more, of these principles is 
violated. The additional privacy principles would be built upon the recognition that, in 
addition to the right to have their personal data or information privacy protected, people have 
further privacy rights that are worthy of protection against threats posed by surveillance even 
when no PII is processed; continuing the numbering from the ISO principles, these are: 
(12) a right to dignity, i.e., freedom from infringements upon their person or reputation;15 
(13) a right to be let alone (privacy of the home, etc.);16 
(14) a right to anonymity, including the right to express one’s views anonymously;17 
(15) a right to autonomy, i.e., freedom of thought and action, without being surveilled;18 
(16) a right to individuality and uniqueness of identity;19 
(17) a right to assemble or associate with others, without being surveilled; 
(18) a right to conﬁdentiality and secrecy of communications; 
(19) a right to travel (in physical or cyber space), without being surveilled;20 
(20) a right not to have to pay in order to exercise their other rights of privacy (subject to 
any justiﬁable exceptions), and not to be denied goods or services on a less pre- 
ferential basis.21 
Some general remarks should be made at this point. First, some privacy rights can also 
function as privacy principles that can be used for identifying risks and harms. Privacy is a 
fundamental right in the EU by virtue of Article7 of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  
the European Union, which states that ‘[e]veryone has the right to respect for his or her 
private and family life, home and communications.’ A principle is a shared value, whereas a 
right is an entitlement; but they are mutually implicated. The ISO 29100 standard deﬁnes 
‘privacy principles’ as a ‘set of shared values governing the privacy protection of personally 
identiﬁable information (PII) when processed in information and communication technology 
systems’. While this deﬁnition is inadequate because it contextualises privacy principles as 
relating to PII only, insofar as the standard can recognise other types of privacy, the concise 
deﬁnition of a privacy principle as a ‘shared value’ stands. Privacy standards can support 
privacy rights by providing a method to address privacy risks, but they cannot make 
mandatory a right to dignity or free speech. However, privacy standards can address privacy 
as a collection of rights and not simply the right of data protection. That some privacy rights 
can function as privacy principles makes them useful instruments on the basis of what 
questions can be formulated that will help understand whether a new technology or system 
might violate one of these principles. It is a structured way for assessing privacy risks in a 
more encompassing PIA, which is further discussed below.  
Second, just as there are different types of privacy, so there is a collection of privacy rights, 
as identiﬁed above. The above rights offer more granularity as to what speciﬁcally is a 
privacy right. There may be other rights to privacy not identiﬁed as such here, but this list is 
relatively comprehensive at present. It is not intended to be systematic, but gives speciﬁcity 
to the right to privacy. 
Third, which type or right of privacy should be regarded as on the same plane as another, or 
as a container for, or contained by, another, can be construed in different ways, and has been 
a matter of debate amongst theorists of privacy for a very long time (Schoeman 1986). A 
recent postulation is Marx’s (2012, ix – xi) construction that locates anonymity within 
information privacy and as a condition for being let alone. He also sees information privacy 
as encompassing physical or bodily privacy as well as ‘aesthetic privacy’: sealing off certain 
private activities and unguarded moments from public view; this is akin to dignity. For him, 
information privacy is tied to spaces and places among a host of institutional and sectoral 
settings. But the history of privacy discourse shows that this is not the only possible ‘take’ on 
privacy, and that information privacy is not necessarily the only possible ruling paradigm. 
Fourth, this list is more conveniently expressed in terms of rights that should be protected 
than in terms of what the state or the private sector should or should not do, in very speciﬁc 
terms, when handling personal data or engaging in other surveillance practices. The 
awkwardness of expression cannot be ignored, because principles must send a clear signal to 
the parties concerned about their activities, obligations, expectations, and remedies, and they 
must give a convincing account of why they should command compliance. A danger is that 
their enunciation may remain mere celebratory rhetoric without a cogent link to policy and 
practice. Nonetheless, it is likely that the ‘legacy’ principles of data protection, as embodied 
in the ISO principles, would lend themselves to rules and guidelines for surveillance practices 
(e.g., watching, tracking, data-mining, etc.) that infringe upon people’s thoughts, spaces and 
associations. For example, the rules regarding consent, purposes, limitations, transparency 
and accountability seem directly applicable to forms of surveillance that threaten these rights, 
and could restrain the activities of surveillance practitioners whether or not PII is involved. 
Fifth, although conﬂating rights and freedoms may be questionable, it is not unprecedented. 
The additional list springs from a recognition or assertion of rights that draws upon the 1950 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (usually termed 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)). This combines rights and freedoms, 
articulating several ‘freedoms’ including: thought, conscience and religion; expression; 
assembly and association; and (in the 1963 Protocol No. 4) movement. There is also a ‘right 
to liberty’. It is obvious that the list is not stated in the same form as the acquis of principles 
found in the OECD, CoE, APEC, ISO and other authoritative guidelines or ‘principles’ 
documents, not only because those principles relate to information privacy and therefore 
instruct data controllers about ethical and legal performance requirements – including their 
relationships with individuals – in processing personal data. 
It is also because the additional rights or principles cannot so easily address speciﬁc persons 
or organisations whose activities might pose threats, because the threats are ubiquitous and 
their sources often not easily identiﬁable. 
This, of course, in turn contributes to the difﬁculty of asserting these principles in the 
language of rights, as is done above, because the imposition of speciﬁc correlative obligations 
is indeterminate in some instances and does not obtain in others, depending upon the type of 
right in question (Wenar 2011). Nevertheless, here too, there is a precedent, as seen in the 
Australian Privacy Charter (APCC 1994). The Charter’s principles are headed: consent; 
accountability; observance; openness; freedom from surveillance; privacy of communication; 
private space; physical privacy; anonymous transactions; col- lection limitation; information 
quality; access and correction; security; use and disclosure limitation; retention limitation; 
public registers; and ‘no disadvantage’ (no payment in order to exercise rights). The preamble 
to the APC elides the distinction between principles and rights by saying that their privacy 
principles ‘comprise both the rights that each person is entitled to expect and protect, and the 
obligations of organisations and others to respect those rights’.22 The APC underpins its 
principles with rights, especially when it asserts that ‘[p]eople have a right to the privacy of 
their own body, private space, privacy of communications, information privacy (rights 
concerning information about a person), and freedom from surveillance.’ Moreover, it 
upholds autonomy, dignity, freedom of association, and free speech. 
In any case, it goes without saying that – as with those that are already well established – any 
rights related to new principles or newly recognised types of privacy are not absolute, but can 
be overridden under strictly limited circumstances, as in Article 8(2) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (CoE 1950); disputes over the applicability of these limitations 
in speciﬁc instances are subject to judicial decision. 
Applicability of the privacy principles to the types of privacy 
As a ﬁrst step towards identifying risks to each type of privacy and ultimately indicating the 
measures that can be taken to avoid them, it is useful to construct a matrix showing the 
applicability of the various privacy principles – as construed here – to the seven types of 
privacy. Underlining the overlap among the principles and among the types of privacy, the 
matrix indicates that most principles are associated with more than one privacy type. In 
addition, the ‘Xs’ in the various cells should be regarded as indicative, rather than as 
deﬁnitive; in some instances, there may be different points of view about the applicability of 
some principles to some types of privacy. This is, in general, not signiﬁcantly different from 
the state of current discourse and jurisprudence, in which judgments vary about the practices 
that are covered by different, but related, legal or ethical precepts. 
Table 1 aims to correlate privacy principles and types of privacy. Xs are in some cells and not 
in others because some principles are more closely correlated with particular types of privacy 
than others. For example, consent is a well-recognised principle in data protection, but it is 
not so well recognised in regard to other types of privacy. Similarly, transparency and notice 
do not generally apply, in our view, as principles of privacy of location because the right to 
privacy of location means that individuals have a right to be or travel somewhere (in physical 
and cyber space) without being monitored or tracked. However, it could be claimed that the 
principles of transparency and notice come into play even with privacy of location: for 
example, where one can be tracked in a city festooned with CCTV cameras. 
  
























 Existing privacy principles        
1 Consent and choice X   X    
2 Purpose legitimacy and speciﬁcation X  X X X   
3 Collection limitation X  X X X   
4 Data minimisation   X X X   
5 Use, retention and disclosure limitation X  X X X   
6 Accuracy and quality X   X X   
7 Openness, transparency and notice X  X X X   
8 Individual participation and access    X X   
9 Accountability X  X X X   
10 Information security X  X X X   
11 Privacy compliance X  X X X   
 Other privacy principles        
12  Right to dignity, i.e., freedom from X X X X X X X 
 infringements upon their person or 
reputation 
       
13   Right to be let alone (privacy of the home, etc.) X X X X X X X 
14 Right to anonymity, including the right to express 
one’s views anonymously 
X X X X X X X 
15 Right to autonomy, to freedom of thought and 
action, without being surveilled 
 X X   X X 
16 Right to individuality and uniqueness of identity X     X  













Table 1.    Continued.  
  Privacy of  Privacy of  Privacy of  
Privacy of behaviour and Privacy of data and Privacy of thoughts and Privacy of 
the person action communication image location feelings association 
17 Right to assemble or associate with others, 
without being surveilled 
 
 
X     X 
18 Right to conﬁdentiality and secrecy of 
communications 
  X X  X X 
19 Right to travel (in physical or cyber space), 
without being tracked 
 X   X   
20 People should not have to pay in order to 
exercise their rights of privacy (subject to 
any justiﬁable exceptions), nor be denied goods 
or services or offered them on a less preferential 
basis 




Privacy risks and harms 
In identifying additional principles associated with other types of privacy, it is useful to con- 
sider what is at stake when privacy is violated; therefore, typologies of privacy harms and 
risks could play an important part in further discussion. In practice, the notion of harm is 
familiar in information privacy law and discourse, whether in terms of privacy torts 
(intrusion; public disclosure of private facts; false light in the public eye; and appropriation) 
(Prosser 1960) or of the remedies available to data subjects whose privacy has been 
breached.23 
RAND Europe’s review of the EU Data Protection Directive leans heavily on advocating a 
harms-based approach in which risk is a prevailing concept for regulatory policy and practice 
(Robinson et al. 2009),24  although this is a controversial move in a ﬁeld in which the moral 
force of rights has taken precedence over the pragmatic (but nonetheless disputatious) 
determination of harms through assessing likelihood and severity. The scholarly literature 
includes Perri 6’s look at privacy ‘through the lens of risk’, giving three general categories 
and speciﬁc enumerations: risks of injustice (signiﬁcant inaccuracy; unjust inference; 
function creep; reversal of the presumption of innocence); risks to personal control over 
collection of personal information (excessive or unjustiﬁed surveillance; collection of data 
without the consent of the data subject; denial of access to the means of protecting oneself 
from any of these risks); and risks to dignity by exposure or embarrassment (absence of 
transparency; physical intrusion into space; absence of anonymity; unnecessary or unjustiﬁed 
disclosure or disclosure without consent) (6 1998). Solove expansively discerns ‘four basic 
groups of harmful activities’ involving information: collection (surveillance; interrogation); 
processing (aggregation; identiﬁcation; insecurity; secondary use exclusion); dissemination 
(breach of conﬁdentiality; disclosure; exposure; increased accessibility; blackmail; 
appropriation; distortion); and invasion (intrusion; decisional interference) (Solove 2006).25 
It is important to note that this cornucopia of risk and harm classiﬁcations has been 
conceptualised largely within an information privacy framework with some extensions into 
other types. Nonetheless, the identiﬁcation of additional principles could beneﬁt from the 
discourse on harm and risk – even if the principles are stated in terms of rights rather than 
‘absence of harm’ – as well as from traditional understandings of rights and liberties. One can 
plot the list of privacy principles against – once again – indicative and provisional examples 
of the harms and/or risks to individuals that could arise from their violation. The typology of 
risks used in this article has an afﬁnity with 6’s categories. From a table like that below, it is 
possible to develop risk-related questions that could be used in more sophisticated, more 
comprehensive PIA methodologies addressing all types of privacy rather than just 
information privacy, and showing impacts on entities beyond the individual person (Raab and 
Wright 2012; Wright and Raab 2012). 
The function of Table 2 is to provide examples of risks or harms that could arise when a 
privacy principle is violated. It serves as a guide or explanation for policy-makers as well as 
technology developers and operators as it offers examples of harms to each of the listed 
privacy principles. Such tables can be and are used in PIA guidance documents. A company 
or government agency aiming at legal and ethical compliance might wish to use, or to 
construct, such a table. As part of the PIA process, such a table could help ensure that a 
newly envisaged technology or system is not developed in a way that intrudes upon the 
different types of privacy and principles. 
This table is not intended to be a comprehensive risk-mapping tool; it is indicative, not 
deﬁnitive, and can support PIA and SIA methods. The value it adds to existing methods is its 
more systematic, structured approach to privacy risk identiﬁcation, assessment and 
management. The more encompassing PIA that we propose is an innovation. 
Table 2.   Privacy principles and examples of risks or harms. 
 
 Existing privacy principles Examples of main risks or harms 
 
1 Consent and choice The person is not given a meaningful choice; her 
  consent is not obtained (lack of consent: risk to 
  personal control) 
2 Purpose legitimacy and speciﬁcation The purposes of the technology may not comply 
  with applicable law; use of a technology may 
  exceed what is legitimate or speciﬁed (excessive 
  or unjustiﬁed surveillance: risk to personal 
  control) 
3 Collection limitation More data is collected than necessary which 
  enables governments or companies to intrude 
  upon the individual’s privacy (excessive or 
  unjustiﬁed surveillance: risk to personal control) 
4 Data minimisation A company may share data gathered from or 
  about an individual with its corporate allies 
  (function creep or unjust inferences: risk of 
  injustice) 
5 Use, retention and disclosure limitation PII is held longer than necessary, e.g., 
  communications records or DNA of those not 
  charged with an offence (excessive surveillance 
  and inaccuracy, lack of anonymity: risk of 
  injustice, risk to personal control and risk to 
  dignity) 
6 Accuracy and quality A company or government may hold incorrect 
  data about an individual which puts her on a 
  ‘no-ﬂy’ list, for example (inaccuracy and 
  reversal of presumption of innocence: risk of 
  injustice and risk to dignity) 
7 Openness, transparency and notice A company may collect a person’s PII but may 
  not tell her (or anyone) how her data is being 
  used (lack of transparency: risk of injustice and 
  risk to dignity) 
8 Individual participation and access A company may collect PII but not allow the 
  individual to access her records (inaccuracy and 
  lack of transparency: risk of injustice, risk to 
  personal control and risk to dignity) 
9 Accountability The organisation has not assigned 
  accountability to anyone, hence, everyone 
  shirks their responsibility for adhering to 
  privacy and/or data protection legislation (a 
  variety of harms: risk of injustice, risk to 
  personal control and risk to dignity) 
10 Information security The organisation does not take proper care for 
  ensuring the security of data, which leads to 
  employees’ losing PII as well as data breaches 
  (failure of conﬁdentiality: risk to personal 
  control and risk to dignity) 
11 Privacy compliance The organisation does not adequately comply 
  with data protection legislation and has not 
  subjected itself to independent third-party 
  review or audit (a variety of harms: risk of 
  injustice, risk to personal control and risk to 
  dignity) 
(Continued) 
  
 Table 2.   Continued. 
 
 
Other privacy principles Examples of main risks or harms  
12 Right to dignity, i.e., freedom from infringements 
upon the person or her reputation 
Airport authorities may require travellers to submit to a 
body scan if they wish to ﬂy (physical intrusion, reversal 
of presumption of innocence, lack of genuine consent: risk 
of injustice, risk to personal control and risk to dignity) 
13 Right to be let alone (privacy of the home, etc.) Governments, companies and malicious persons may be 
constantly trying to ﬁnd out what a person is doing or 
thinking or where she is going. Marketers may call, 
contact or otherwise spam people to sell them something 
(lack of anonymity, lack of consent, intrusiveness: risk to 
personal control and risk to dignity) 
14 Right to anonymity, including the right to express 
one’s views anonymously 
With facial recognition, anonymous speech in public 
places may be impossible; governments, companies, law 
enforcement authorities, intelligence agencies and 
miscreants may try to determine who expressed what 
views on the Internet (lack of anonymity: risk to dignity) 
15 ight to autonomy, to freedom of thought and 
action, without being surveilled 
New technologies may infer a person’s emotional state or 
even what thoughts cross her mind; other technologies 
may inﬂuence her behaviour, attitudes, views (inaccuracy, 
lack of consent, intrusiveness: risk to personal control and 
risk to dignity) 
16 Right to individuality and uniqueness of identity Social sorting and proﬁling may stereotype people; a 
person may try to express her individuality, but 
governments and companies may try to inﬂuence her or 
limit her choices and thus her life chances (unjust 
inference, excessive or unjustiﬁed surveillance: risk of 
injustice, risk to personal control and risk to dignity) 
17 Right to assemble or associate with others 
without being surveilled 
The pervasiveness of CCTV makes it difﬁcult or  
impossible for a person to associate with others without 
the knowledge of state agencies or companies (lack of 
anonymity, unjust inference: risk of injustice and risk to 
dignity) 
18 Right to conﬁdentiality and secrecy of 
communications 
Intelligence agencies may monitor many people’s 
communications without a warrant (lack of 
conﬁdentiality, excessive surveillance: risk to personal 
control and risk to dignity) 
19 Right to travel (in physical or cyber space) 
without being tracked 
Facebook used its Beacon ‘service’ to alert associates 
about users’ likes and preferences without their consent or 
knowledge; Google created the Buzz social network based 
on people’s emails without telling them or seeking their 
consent in advance (lack of consent and transparency: risk 
to personal control and risk to dignity) 
20 People should not have to pay in order to exercise 
their rights of privacy (subject to any justiﬁable 
exceptions), nor be denied goods or services or 
offered them on a less preferential basis 
Targeted advertising may mean that some consumers pay 
more for the same service than others 
 Decision-makers would do well to avoid a strictly compliance-based approach to privacy 
risk. At a time when privacy appears to be threatened more than ever before, and by novel 
kinds of surveillance, further guidance could be given to industry and others to uncover 
privacy risks by using sets of questions to identify privacy risks, rather than ticking some 
boxes on a form. While organisational project managers and decision- makers may ﬁnd it 
useful to consider and comply with the privacy principles listed in this article in the 
development of new projects, services, applications, products, proposed legislation or other 
initiatives, project managers or decision-makers should not lose sight of the primary 
objective, which is to identify and resolve privacy risks before they materialise. 
PIA methodology prompts an important but infrequently asked question (Raab 2005): should 
a surveillance technology or system be considered privacy-safe until proven dangerous, or 
dangerous until proven safe? PIA may require a reasonable demonstration of the latter; laws 
and litigation may be based on the former. PIA concentrates minds upon the question of the 
privacy risks people face. If such questioning can take the practice and theory of privacy 
protection beyond a merely casual use of the term ‘risk’, it could perform an overdue service. 
Whatever the ambiguity of applying risk analysis to the privacy implications of technological 
design and application, risk assessment may thus help data controllers, regulators, PIA 
practitioners and the public to a better understanding and to a more fully informed privacy 
debate. 
 
Conclusion:  Why we need to debate privacy principles 
It is useful to generate debate about these principles and harms for at least four main reasons. 
First, it will help to refocus the attention of policy-makers, regulators, academics and 
advocates away from only, or primarily, data protection to the detriment of other types of 
privacy and privacy rights, which may be affected by policies and practices. Privacy and data 
protection are each accorded an article (7 and 8 respectively) in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (European Parliament, the Council and the Commission 2000), 
so there should in theory be parity between these two rights. However, such is not the case in 
the EU, which has a Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) and a proposal for a Data 
Protection Regulation, but it does not have a Privacy Directive or Privacy Regulation. The 
EU has an Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (which is expected to evolve into a 
European Data Protection Board), and Member States have Data Protection Authorities 
(DPAs) – regulatory agencies that elsewhere in the world are termed Privacy 
Commissioners.26 
These are only in part semantic examples; they highlight the reality of what ‘privacy’ 
protection has come to mean. González Fuster and her colleagues write, 
Practices that do not constitute a personal data protection issue strictu sensu can still represent an 
infringement of the right to privacy – and vice versa. EU institutions should never limit the assessment 
of the impact on fundamental rights of security measures that comprise the processing of personal data 
to an assessment of their compliance with data protection law. (González Fuster, De Hert and Gutwirth 
2011: 4; emphasis added) 
Clarke has also decried the ‘serious debasement of the term “privacy” ...[where it has been 
equated]... with the highly restrictive idea of “data protection”’ (Clarke 2006). Cate has made 
a somewhat similar observation: ‘Modern privacy law… has substituted individual control of 
information, which it in fact rarely achieves, for privacy protection’ (Cate 2006, 374). 
Although some DPAs have dismissed the difference between data protection and privacy as 
so much semantic posturing, they have sometimes addressed technologies that pose risks to 
types of privacy other than data protection: body scanners are an example (Article 29 
Working Party 2009) of a technology that impacts privacy of the person, which is not a 
violation of information privacy unless the scanners process personal information. The same 
is true of surveillance drones that impact privacy of behaviour. Expanding the array of 
privacy principles helps to achieve a better relationship between a procedural approach to 
information privacy and a human rights approach.  
Second, formulating privacy principles (rights, freedoms) and indicating the harms that arise 
when they are violated is of critical importance at a time when PIA and/or DPIA may become 
mandatory, as set out in Article 33 in the European Commission’s pro- posed Data Protection 
Regulation. PIA is an important instrument to identify privacy risks and ways of avoiding, 
minimising, retaining or sharing them. The term ‘PIA’ has been used around the world, 
although its application to only data protection has some unfortunate consequences. For 
example, when identifying privacy ‘targets’ (an unfortunate term), the industry-dominated 
group developing an RFID PIA framework chose only the data protection principles in the 
EU Data Protection Directive (Spiekermann 2012). If RFID applications raise other privacy 
issues beyond compliance with data protection principles, they are likely to be overlooked. 
Just when arguments for overcoming this restriction have come into view (Wright and Raab 
2012), the European Commission has introduced the term DPIA in the proposed Regulation, 
which might underline the limited focus and suggest to some that the Commission is less 
interested in broad-based rights assessments of the impacts on privacy of new technologies or 
other initiatives than it is on their impact on data protection. Hence, it is important that PIA, 
to be fully effective, addresses all types of privacy and the associated privacy principles, and 
the risk of harm to a wider array of rights. Any future revision of ISO 29100 could also take 
into account the suggestions made in this article. 
Third, European policy-makers and other stakeholders might consider the status of Article 7 
(private and family life) of the Charter now that Article 8 grants the new right to data 
protection. This has traditionally been implemented under ‘privacy’ rights in other totemic 
documents in this ﬁeld, such as Article 8 of the ECHR, and therefore the primary focus on 
data protection in Europe has drawn attention away from other types of privacy impacted by 
technological change, government policy and commercial practice. A step toward the 
recalibration of the relationship between data protection and privacy could be to recognise the 
different types of privacy – as the ICO did in its version 2 PIA Handbook, for example – and, 
in doing so, to consider the privacy principles with which they are associated. Privacy 
regulation could and should be based on Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union as well as Article 16 of the Lisbon Treaty. 
We recognise that there could be a risk that, if one brings too many aspects under the 
umbrella of privacy, the term could become meaningless and lose its power to safeguard a 
core of privacy protection. However, the motivation of this article is the recognition of the 
need to reinforce the protection of other types of privacy that are less well protected now. 
Some types of privacy – for example, privacy of location – are severely threatened by 
technological, business, and government policy developments, especially with regard to 
national security and law enforcement. Adequate protection of all types of privacy is essential 
if we are to resist the ubiquity of surveillance systems that undermine democracy and the rule 
of law. 
Coda 
Finally, we add a brief status report, with reference to developments that are underway at the 
time of writing. PIAs are explicitly mandatory in the UK, but only for the public sector, 
although the public sector in some cases is now requiring private sector suppliers to do PIAs 
too. The UK ICO PIA Handbook explicitly, and in some detail, mentions four types of 
privacy. If the proposed Data Protection Regulation is adopted, DPIAs will become 
mandatory where speciﬁc risks are present. In reality, we think many organisations will do 
PIAs anyway. The process of conducting a PIA and a DPIA is more or less the same; the 
principal difference is in scope. A PIA has a wider scope, up to seven types of privacy to 
consider. The need for a more encompassing PIA method is apparent when one considers 
some of the examples mentioned above, for example, body scanners impact privacy of the 
person and drones impact privacy of behaviour. Since the Snowden revelations, most 
companies are much more aware of the need to conduct proper PIAs, because large swaths of 
the public do not trust them. In the ISO’s process of ﬁnalising a draft PIA standard, the ideal 
would be to have a legislative provision for PIA, but that is unlikely to happen at the 
European level at this time. 
A suitable legal basis for a mandatory PIA would be an amendment to the proposed Data 
Protection Regulation. A separate Regulation devoted to other types of privacy would be 
even better. However, a new piece of legislation devoted to privacy would take some years to 
develop, adopt and bring into force. The ISO is well along in the development of a PIA 
standard, which we expect to be adopted in 2015. Although it too has a focus on data 
protection, it does explicitly mention other types of privacy. 
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Notes 
1. In addition to the documents described here, other examples include Scottish 
Government (2011), Marx (1998) and Pounder (2008). 
2. The HEW report was one of the ﬁrst such reports, but by no means the ﬁrst, as its 
Appendix B makes clear. Even earlier initiatives had been undertaken in the UK, 
Canada and some other countries. See, for example, Home Ofﬁce (1972) and Task 
Force on Privacy and Computers (1972). 
3.  Space limitations prevent full description of these principles. 
4. OECD (1980, General Background, para 38). 
5. This article does not deal with recent revisions of the OECD and CoE documents. 
6. Further discussion of old and new principles can be found in Raab (2012). 
7. The New Act also signiﬁcantly strengthens the powers of the Australian Information 
Commissioner to conduct investigations and ensure compliance with the amended 
Privacy Act. See DLA Piper, Data Protection Laws of the World, March 2013, pp. 11 
– 12. See also Talevski and Osman (2013). 
8. See Part 2, section 6 of the Act. 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0028/latest/viewpdf.aspx 
9. Clarke identiﬁed these four categories even earlier, in his PhD Supplication in 1995. 
See http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/PhD.html. He has variously referred to the four 
categories as categories, interests, dimensions, components and aspects. We use the 
term ‘types’, which is used in the PIA adopted by various privacy regulators in 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and Ireland. 
10. The last-named item is often called ‘informational self-determination’, a pillar of 
information privacy protection in Germany. 
11. However, the ICO’s new PIA code of practice, adopted in March 2014 (ICO 2014) 
following a four-month consultation period, has reduced the types of privacy to two, 
i.e., information privacy and physical privacy. The consultation was carried out 
between August and November 2013. Information Commissioner’s Ofﬁce (ICO), 
‘Privacy impact assessments code published’, News release,  25   Feb   2014.   
http://ico.org.uk/news/latest_news/2014/privacy-impact-assessments-code-published. 
12. Gary T. Marx (1998) reﬂects these changes in his articulation of a ‘new ethics of 
surveillance’, but his focus is predominantly upon surveillance as involving personal 
data collection, the province of traditional privacy law and regulation. 
13. For a more detailed exegesis of the seven types, see Finn et al. (2013). 
14. For a review of publicly available PIA reports in the UK, see Wright (2014). 
15. The right to dignity is proclaimed in Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union: ‘Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and 
protected.’http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:0391:0407:EN:PDF  
16. See Principle 8 in the Australian Privacy Charter: ‘Private space – People have a right 
to private space in which to conduct their personal affairs. This right applies not only 
in a person’s home, but also, to varying degrees, in the workplace, the use of 
recreational facilities and public places.’ Jacoby says similarly: ‘The concept of 
“home” or living quarters has been construed broadly to be understood as any domain 
of privacy’ (Jacoby 2007: 457). The ‘right to be let alone’ is the oldest and best-
known deﬁnition of privacy. However, its applicability today is wider than was the 
case back in 1890 when Warren and Brandeis penned their classic essay. We interpret 
the right to be let alone as covering, for example, not being subjected to unsolicited 
marketing telephone calls, not being videoed every time one talks to a friend in a bar, 
not being tracked wherever one drives one’s car or every time one turns on one’s 
computer, not being required to go through a body scanner, etc. In other words, the 
right to be let alone is applicable to all seven types of privacy. 
17. See Principle 10 in the Australian Privacy Charter: ‘Anonymous transactions – People 
should have the option of not identifying themselves when entering transactions.’ This 
is only one example of anonymity. 
18. ‘Individuals not only need to be able to be alone with their own thoughts, but they 
also need to be free to share those thoughts with others without being subject to the 
watchful, possibly critical, eye of the state… By ensuring that there is a limit on what 
the state can know about us, privacy not only helps to protect individual autonomy, 
but also leaves us free to use that autonomy in the exercise of other fundamental 
rights like the right to free speech’ (Goold 2010, 43). See also Principle 6 of the 
Australian Privacy Charter: ‘Freedom from surveillance – People have a right to 
conduct their affairs free from surveillance or fear of surveillance. “Surveillance” 
means the systematic observation or recording of one or more people’s behaviour, 
communications, or personal information.’ 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1876069  
19. This is an anti-discrimination principle, because proﬁling and social sorting pose 
threats to individuality. 
20. Principle 8 in the Australian Privacy Charter relates to this, although not to travel or 
movement as such: ‘Private space – People have a right to private space in which to 
conduct their personal affairs. This right applies not only in a person’s home, but also, 
to varying degrees, in the workplace, the use of recreational facilities and public 
places.’ 
21. This principle has been adapted from Principle 18 in the Australian Privacy Charter: 
‘No disadvantage’. 
22. http://www.privacy.org.au/About/PrivacyCharter.html. The Charter was produced by 
the Australian Privacy Charter Council (APCC), a civil society group. 
23. See, for example, ‘damage’ and ‘distress’ in the UK Data Protection Act 1998, § 13. 
24. This was prepared for the UK Information Commissioner’s Ofﬁce. 
25. As Calo has shown, with reference to Solove, there are still further complications – 
and scholarly disagreements – in discussing privacy harms and risks. These relate to 
how the boundaries are drawn round what is, or is not, a privacy harm (the need for a 
‘rule of recognition’ to determine the limits; and the relationship between subjective 
(perceptions of loss of control, resulting in fear or discomfort) and objective (actual 
adverse consequences) categories of harm (Calo 2011). The present article does not 
address these and other issues in the understanding of risk and harm. 
26. A further point in the same vein can be made: in data protection legislation, the 
individual is referred to as a ‘data subject’ – a depersonalised term that strips the 
individual of her individuality, as though she were only a set of 1s and 0s. At the EC 
level, there appear to be few policy documents focused on other types of privacy as 
distinct from data protection. 
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